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Abstract: The Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) decision, in which the Supreme Court 
authorized post-sentence civil commitment for certain sex offenders, appeared to be 
constitutionally le gitimized by limiting the class of offenders eligible for this special form 
of civil commitment to those who are “unable to control” their dangerousness. Nowhere 
in the available record, however, did the Court elucidate what they meant by this notion of 
volitional impairment. This study sought to examine factors that legal professionals (n = 43), 
psychologists (n = 40), and mock jurors (n = 76) deem most relevant to a determination of 
sex offender volitional impair ment. Participants, who were randomly assigned to a sexual 
predator commitment or an insanity hearing context, read a series of 16 vignettes that 
described a pedophilic offender and included combinations of variables hypothesized to be 
related to judgments of volitional impairment. Re sults suggested that participants, who as a 
group made remarkably high estimates of likelihood of future sexual violence, considered 
verbalization of control, history of sexual violence, and the context of the hearing as highly 
relevant to determinations of volitional impairment. Implications for policy and practice 
are explored. 
Keywords: Sex offender, Sexual predator, Civil commitment, Sexual violence, Risk 
assessment, Control, Sex offending, Hendricks 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) decision, allowing indeterminate 
civil commitment for certain sex offenders after completion of a prison sentence, refl ects 
increasing societal concern about the problem of repeat sexual predation. Under the 
Kansas statute at issue, civil commitment requires that the state demonstrate that the sexual 
offender suffers from a “mental abnormality or personality disorder” and that this disorder 
renders the offender “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” (K.S.A., 1994, 
59-29a02). At trial, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks qualifi ed as 
a sexually violent predator, based upon the facts that Hendricks “suffers from pedophilia” 
and “continues to harbor sexual desires toward children,” which he admittedly cannot 
control when “stressed out” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997, p. 2078). 
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In Hendricks (1997), the majority seemed to view the inability to control behavior as 
a distinc tive form of mental abnormality that legitimized the commitment. The majority 
opinion noted that a fi nding of volitional impairment limits involuntary civil commitment 
“in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confi nement to those who are unable 
to control their dangerousness” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997, p. 2080). Justice Thomas, 
writing for the majority, indicated that “this admitted lack of volitional control, coupled 
with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other 
dangerous persons who are perhaps more prop erly dealt with exclusively through criminal 
proceedings” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997, p. 2080). Though the Court appeared to rely 
largely upon Hendricks’ assertion of a lack of control over behavior and prior history of 
sexual violence in fi nding that he suffered a volitional impairment, nowhere in the available 
record did the Court clarify what is meant by the vague notion of volitional impairment. 
Should the Court be relying in part upon Hendricks’ history of sexual violence, it is 
unclear how “inability to control” behavior is something other than criminal recidivism. 
Schopp (1998) comments that the fact that some individuals choose to repeatedly act upon 
antisocial desires provides no evidence of volitional impairment, as we have no way of 
differentiating those offenders who legitimately lose control from those who simply choose 
to violate social rules (Schopp, 1998). Moreover, relying on Hendricks’ declaration of 
loss of control might be of questionable validity and reliability. Morse (1998) argues that 
such subjective feelings are not suffi cient to establish that one is, in fact, out of control. 
Such subjective report, with the potential to be minimized or exaggerated to satisfy a legal 
threshold, is not a reliable or valid way to measure volitional impairment (Morse, 1998). 
In Kansas v. Crane (2002) the Supreme Court clarifi ed the ambiguity of whether 
Hendricks required inability to control behavior, suggesting in the majority opinion that 
although a complete lack of control is not required, something less than a complete lack 
of control is an important consideration. While the Court did not provide a clear account 
of what might qualify as something less than an absolute lack of control, it did note that 
those eligible for commitment will generally fi nd it “particularly diffi cult to control their 
behavior” (Kansas v. Crane, 2002, p. 414). As in Hendricks, however, the Court failed to 
describe how the pathology manifested by Crane affected his volitional capacity. 
A brief history of the insanity defense and volitional impairment 
The acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. (after the attempted assassination of former President 
Reagan) under the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code insanity defense 
standard fueled a growing controversy about the defi nitional ambiguity of the notion of 
volitional impairment. Indeed, both the American Bar Association (ABA) (1983) and 
the American Psychiatric As sociation (APA) (1983) advocated for the abolition of the 
volitional prong, asserting that less consistent application of the insanity defense would 
result from utilizing such an imprecise standard (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 
1997). These concerns about how to opera tionalize volition led the APA (1983) to issue the 
following statement: “The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted 
is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk...” (p. 685). 
   The ABA (1983) similarly criticized volitional tests by noting that there is still no 
valid or reli able basis for measuring capacity for or impairment of self control. Rogers 
(1984b) suggests that clinicians generally agree in judgments about both volitional (κ 
= .80) and cognitive (κ = .75) standards and argues that political pressure, rather than 
empiricism, precipitated the truncating of the ALI standard (by removal of the volitional 
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prong) (Rogers, 1984a). Others, however, note a lack of objective criteria on which to 
judge whether an impulse is truly irresistible or simply not resisted (Melton et al., 1997) 
and argue that litigation is often reduced to subjective moral guesswork, as we do not have 
an objective methodology for determining volitional impairment (Bonnie, 1984). Thus, 
although evaluators may make consistent attributions of volitional im pairment, it remains 
unclear whether those attributions refl ect impairment appropriate for any legal purpose. 
Attempts to defi ne volitional impairment 
Schopp (1991) suggests that in a literal interpretation of volitional impairment, one lacks 
con trol over behavior if one is literally unable to direct movement (or lack of movement) 
through decision, while in a more fl exible interpretation there are degrees to which behavior 
is con trolled. While other legal theorists (e.g., Morse, 1994; Rachlin, Halpern, & Portnow, 
1984)have suggested factors that may be relevant to the exercise of control, these accounts can 
merely offer guidance as to the types of factors that courts may consider relevant. Moreover, as 
these frameworks have generally been developed with reference to the insanity context, their 
relevance to the concept of volition in the sexual predator arena appears less certain. While 
caselaw in the dangerous predator context gives some indication of what may be relevant 
to an inability to control standard (e.g., repeated misconduct despite consequences) (In re 
Crocker, 1997; In re Kunshier, 1995; In re Mattson, 1996), as well as what is not necessarily 
required for volitional impairment (e.g., literal volitional impairment) (In re Kunshier, 1995; 
In re Patterson, 1995), generally there is no clear articulation of what qualifi es as inability to 
control and court opinions are, at times, contradictory in nature. For example, in Minnesota, 
the Linehan I (1994) and Schweninger (1994) courts considered evidence of planning and 
grooming to be inconsistent with a fi nding of lack of volitional control, while other courts 
found the lack of control standard met, even where an offender had engaged in grooming (In 
re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530 [Minn. Ct. App. 1994]; In re Adolphson, 1995), where 
the offender’s acts were characterized by a “fair amount of planning and deliberateness” (In 
re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d at 905 [Minn. Ct. App. 1995]), and where the offender’s actions were 
“deliberate to some degree” (In re Mayfi eld, No. C2-95-103 at 3 [Minn. Ct. App. 1995]). 
Although there also have been attempts to operationalize the legal construct of volitional 
impairment (Hall, 1985; Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., 2002) and even specifi c guidelines developed 
for assessing control in the insanity context (Rogers & Shuman, 2000), there tends to be 
no coherent account of how one might differentiate an actor who has veritably lost control 
from one who has decidedly abandoned control. Moreover, it is uncertain whether these 
guidelines or operationalizations are in fact consistent with how the Supreme Court is 
conceptualized control in Hendricks and Crane. Finally, there has been, on the whole, little 
empirical research exploring the construct of self-control. Most studies that have attempted 
an examination, however, have considered areas outside the context of sexual coercion, 
such as gambling, substance abuse, or eating behaviors. Whether the processes that 
undermine self-control in such situations are similar to those which undermine self-control 
with respect to sexual offenses is uncertain. Shively (2001), in a vignette study examining 
perceptions of self control among sexual aggressors found that alcohol consumption was 
the sole factor among a set of contextual variables that signifi cantly lowered participants’ 
ratings of self-control. Indeed, considerable physiological and neuroscience research seems 
to support a link between alcohol and substance use and impairment in the inhibitory and 
activational aspects of behavioral control (Casbon, 2005; Fillmore, Marczinski, &Bowman, 
2005; Lundqvist, 2005). Thus, while caselaw, empirical research, legal theory, and practice 
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guidelines may offer some indication as to what is relevant to a determination of volitional 
impairment, there does not seem to be a clear conceptualization across or within these 
various disciplines (for a review see Mercado, Schopp, & Bornstein, 2005). Instead, there 
is pervasive ambiguity and uncertainty, with clear defi nition of the notion rarely given. 
Research in the sexually violent predator context 
Little empirical research has yet explored issues directly relevant to the civil commitment 
of sex offenders. In a vignette study that did examine juror decision-making in the sexual 
predator context, Guy and Edens (2003) found that participants gave “remarkably high” 
ratings of sexual violence risk across all conditions of the study, with estimates ranging from 
59 to 71% that the defendant would commit future acts of sexual violence if not civilly 
committed (p. 229). In another vignette study examining commitment decisions in the sexual 
predator context, Mercado, Pearce, and Schopp (2002) found that the majority of their sample 
(66%) disagreed with the notion that the sexual predator described in the vignette was unable 
to control his conduct. Notably, however, results suggested that decisions about volitional 
impairment were unrelated to decisions about whether or not to commit sexual offenders. 
Related research has, for example, examined the reliability of commitment criteria under 
Florida’s SVP statute (Levenson, 2004a), reported descriptive information on the characteristics 
of sex offenders petitioned for commitment (Becker, Stinson, Tromp, & Messer, 2003; Janus, 
2000), and compared sex offenders recommended for release with sex offenders recommended 
for commitment (Levenson, 2004b). Notably, Levenson (2004b) found that evaluators recom-
mended for commitment all of the offenders (n = 10) who had verbalized an intent to reoffend. 
Purpose of the present study 
Since the Supreme Court decided in Crane (2002) that some degree of inability to control 
behavior is necessary to legitimize Kansas’ sexual predator commitment act, the question of 
ability to control behavior has become fundamental to sexual predator commitment decisions. 
The present study was designed to address several research questions: (1) How do four factors 
identifi ed in empirical research and case law as relevant (verbalized lack of control [Hendricks, 
1997], history of sexual crimes [Hendricks, 1997], offense planning [In re Adolphson, 1995, 
In re Bieganoswki, 1994, In re Crocker, 1997, In re Kunshier, 1995, In re Mattson, 1995, In re 
Mayfi eld, 1995, In re Patterson, 1995, In re Pirkl, 1995, In re Schweninger, 1994], and substance 
use [Casbon, 2005; Fillmore et al., 2005; Lundqvist, 2005; Shively, 2001]) relate to scaled and 
forced choice judgments of volitional impairment? (2) How do variables hypothesized to be 
related to judgments of volitional impairment affect judgments of mental disorder? (3) How do 
the variables hypothesized to be related to judgments of volitional impairment affect judgments 
about likelihood of future sexual violence? (4) Does context matter when making judgments 
about volitional impairment; that is, do evaluators consider volitional impairment differently in 
the SVP and insanity contexts? (5) Is there consensus on conceptions of volitional impairment 
across groups of legal professionals, psychologists, and mock jurors? 
Method 
Participants 
The sample, which consisted of 159 participants comprising three groups who have a 
unique role with regard to the process of civilly committing sex offenders, included 43 legal 
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professionals, 40 psychologists, and 76 jury-eligible undergraduates. Participants received 
either course credit (undergraduates) or monetary compensation of $15 (professional 
groups) for their participation. Those offered monetary compensation were given a choice 
of receiving the money themselves or donating it to selected charitable organizations. 
Legal professionals included 31 attorneys and 12 judges (31 male, 12 female; mean age = 
44.8 years). Of the legal professionals, 41 identifi ed their ethnicity as White, one as African 
American, and one as Latino American. Sixty-fi ve percent of the legal professionals indicated 
that they had been in the profession for twenty years or less, while approximately 35% indicated 
that they had been in the profession for 21 years or more. Of the 31 attorneys, 39% reported being 
primarily involved in criminal defense, 3% reported being primarily involved in criminal prose-
cution, and 59% indicated that their work was not primarily for the criminal defense nor criminal 
prosecution. Thirty-fi ve percent of the legal professionals indicated having “little to no” pro-
fessional involvement with sex offenders, while some 40% reported “occasional” involvement, 
26% reported “fairly regular” involvement, and none reported “frequent” involvement. 
Of the psychologists (25 male, 15 female; mean age = 40.7 years), 35 identifi ed their 
ethnicity as White, three as Latino American, one as African American, and one as “Other.” 
Seventy-eight percent of the psychologists indicated having practiced for twenty years or 
less, while 23% had practiced for 21 years or more. Sixty-three percent of the psychologists 
reported “occasional” professional involvement with sex offenders, 25% reported “little to 
no” involvement, 3% reported “fairly regular” involvement, and 10% reported “frequent” 
involvement. Finally, 35.0% of the psychologists indicated that they worked primarily with 
victims of abuse and 18% reported that they worked primarily with offenders, while the largest 
number (48%) indicated that their primary work was with neither offenders nor victims. 
Of the jury-eligible undergraduates (20 male, 56 female; mean age = 23.4 years), 66 
identifi ed their ethnicity as White, four as Biracial, three as African American, two as 
Latino American, and one as Asian/Pacifi c Islander. 
Design and procedure 
The study was a 24 × 2 × 3 mixed design with four types of volitional impairment either 
present or absent (offender verbalization, assault planning, history of pedophilic behavior, 
and substance abuse) among two alternate decision-making contexts (SVP or insanity 
hearing) and administered to three sample pools (legal professionals, psychologists, and 
jury-eligible undergraduates). The within-subject factors were the volitional impairment 
variables and the between-subject factors were context and participant sample. A website 
was created for the presentation of stimuli and collection of data. 
      The jury-eligible undergraduates were recruited from psychology classes at the University 
of Nebraska. The judges were recruited from a public list of all Nebraska County and District 
Court judges. Targeted recruitment of attorneys specializing in criminal law was facilitated 
through websites listing local attorneys and their practice areas (e.g., fi ndlaw.com). It should 
be noted, however, that because many of the attorneys had multiple practice areas listed, 
the fi nal sample included some who do not appear to do regular work in criminal matters. 
To maintain continuity with our legal sample, sampling of general psychologists (recruited 
from the Nebraska Psychological Association (NPA) through an email directory supplied 
by an NPA administrator) and targeted sampling of psychologists specializing in forensic 
practice (recruited from the American Academy of Forensic Psychology (AAFP) through 
an email directory supplied by an AAFP administrator) occurred. Participants were directed 
to the study website either by letter (judges), handouts (jury-eligible undergraduates), or 
email with a link (psychologists, attorneys, and judges with a listed email address). 
592 MERCADO, BORNSTEIN, & SCHOPP IN LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 30 (2006)
Upon accessing the site, all participants were randomly assigned to either the sexual 
predator or insanity decision-making context. Participants in the SVP condition were informed 
that their decisions “may help in determining whether the offender should be sent to a secure 
mental institution for an indefi nite period of time” or “whether the offender will be released 
after completing his prison sentence.” Alternatively, participants in the insanity context were 
informed that their judgments “may help in determining whether the offender should be found 
“not responsible by reason of insanity” or whether the offender should be deemed culpable 
and sent to prison. The order of the vignettes, which included all combinations of the volitional 
impairment variables, was completely randomized to control for carryover effects. 
Materials 
Participants read 16 vignettes (see Appendix) that detailed the presence or absence of each of 
the four hypothesized types of potential volitional impairment. For example, the presence or 
absence of substance abuse was suggested by a statement indicating that the offender “had 
been drinking heavily and using marijuana,” or alternatively by a statement indicating that, 
“There was no evidence to show that [offender’s name] had been drinking or using drugs at 
the time of the offense.” Likewise, evidence of planning was operationalized as the offender 
having “carefully planned the [alleged] assault, by ‘grooming’ the child with candy and other 
indulgences and planning a time when the child’s mother would not be around,” or alternatively 
by a statement indicating that the offender “had not carefully planned the [alleged] assault” nor 
“coaxed the child in any manner nor planned a time when others would not be around.” 
Next, a statement about the offender’s subjective feelings of control was included. The 
offender either admitted “that he is unable to control his conduct when he gets stressed out” or 
acknowledged “that he is able to control his conduct, even when under extreme stress.” The last 
of the four potential volitional impairment variables was offender history. A statement indicated 
that the offender had either a “long history of” or “no known history of” pedophilic behavior. 
Each vignette was followed by four questions, which included: (1) a Likert-type 
assessment of the offender’s degree of volitional impairment (1: complete control over his 
behavior to 7: no control over his behavior), (2) a forced choice judgment of whether or not 
the offender has “serious diffi culty” controlling behavior, (3) a forced choice judgment of 
whether or not the offender suffers a mental disorder, and (4) a forced choice judgment of 
whether or not the offender will be sexually violent in the future. Each of the forced choice 
questions included a Likert-type measure of confi dence. While question one is relevant to 
Crane and Hendricks in that it asks participants to make a graded judgment about control, 
question two more closely mimics the actual forced choice type of judgment that seems 
to be required by Crane. Questions three and four also refl ect the sorts of judgments these 
participants would be required to make in actual commitment proceedings. 
Results 
Overview 
As the basic design of the study was a 24 (volitional impairment variables either present or absent) 
by 2 (context of hearing) by 3 (sample group), the primary statistical test was a mixed analysis 
of variance. This same model was used for all analyses; dichotomous dependent variables were 
averaged across conditions. Results were analyzed through the use of descriptive statistics and a 
repeated measures analysis, accompanied by post hoc analyses to explore interactions. Although 
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higher order interactions were included in the model, only the main effects and two-way 
interactions were analyzed as higher order interactions would likely be uninterpretable due to the 
novel and exploratory nature of this research (Stolle, Robbennolt, Patry, & Penrod, 2002).1 
Likert responses regarding ability to control behavior 
With regard to the Likert-type judgments of the offender’s ability to control behavior, a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with context and participant sample as between-subjects factors 
and the potential volitional impairment variables as within-subjects factors revealed that 
participants were signifi cantly more likely to judge the offender to have control over his 
behavior when the offender had made a statement that he could control his conduct (M = 
3.45) than when the offender had made a statement that he could not control his conduct (M 
= 4.28) (see Table 1). There was also a signifi cant main effect for history, with the direction of 
the means revealing that participants judged offenders to have less control over their behavior 
when there was a history of pedophilic behavior (M = 4.10) than when there was no history 
of pedophilic behavior (M = 3.63). Further, there was a main effect for plan, with offenders 
viewed as having more control when the assault was planned (M = 3.77) than when the 
assault was unplanned (M = 3.96). There was, however, no main effect for substance use. 
With regard to the between subjects variables, a main effect was found for context, F(1, 
152) = 8.66, η2 = .054, p = .004. When participants were told that their decisions were in the 
context of a SVP hearing they perceived the offender as having less control over his behavior 
(M = 4.18) than when their decisions were made in the context of an insanity hearing (M = 
3.50). There was no main effect for sample group, F(2, 152) = 64.86, p = .174 
There was a signifi cant interaction between the offender’s statement regarding his 
subjectively assessed ability to control his own behavior and substance abuse at the time of the 
assault, F(1, 152) = 4.26, η2 = .027, p = .041. When offenders verbalized that they could not 
control their behavior, judgments about control were not dependent upon whether (M = 4.26) 
or not (M = 4.30) offenders had used substances, F(1, 157) = .379, η2 = .002, p = .539, though 
when an offender verbalized that he could control his behavior, judgments were signifi cantly 
dependent upon whether (M = 3.51) or not (M = 3.39) the offender used substances, F(1, 157) 
= 5.08, η2 = .031, p = .026. There were no other signifi cant two-way interactions. 
1 Note that although gender was not specifi cally hypothesized to be related to judgments in this context, an 
exploration of gender was undertaken given the imbalance of gender in sample groups. There were, however, no 
signifi cant main effects or two-way interactions for gender. 
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Forced choice regarding whether offender has “serious diffi culty” controlling behavior 
When asked to make a choice regarding whether an offender has “serious diffi culty” 
controlling his behavior, participants were more likely to make an affi rmative judgment 
that the offender had “serious diffi culty” controlling his behavior when the offender had 
stated that he could not control his conduct (68.8%) than when the offender had stated that 
he could control his conduct (47.6%) (see Table 2). There was also a signifi cant main effect 
for offender history of pedophilic behavior, with participants being more likely to judge 
offenders as having “serious diffi culty” controlling behavior when there was a history of 
pedophilic behavior (65.6%) than when there was no such history (51.0%). There were no 
signifi cant main effects for substance use or planning of the offense. 
     With regard to the between subjects variables, a main effect was found for context, F(1, 
152) = 5.39, η2 = .034, p = .022. When participants were informed that their decisions were 
in the context of a SVP hearing they were more likely to say that an offender had no control 
over behavior (63.7%) than when their decisions were made in the context of an insanity 
hearing (51.9%). There was no main effect for sample group, F(2, 152) = 1.62, p = .202. 
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A signifi cant interaction was found between history of pedophilic conduct and planning 
of the offense, F(1, 152) = 3.92, η2 = .025, p = 0.05. When there was no history of pedophilic 
assaults, judgments about volitional impairment were not dependent upon whether (50.9%) 
or not (51.1%) offenders had planned the offense, F(1, 157) = .005, η2 = .043, p = .945. 
However, when there was a history of pedophilic assaults, participants were signifi cantly 
more likely to judge that the offender had diffi culty controlling conduct when the offense 
was not planned (68.2%) than when the offense was planned (62.9%), F(1, 157) = 7.02, η2 
= .043, p = .009. A signifi cant interaction was also found between offender substance use 
and planning of the offense, F(1, 152) = 4.07, η2 = .026, p = .045. When the offender had 
used substances, judgments about volitional impairment were not dependent upon whether 
(59.0%) or not (59.2%) the offender had planned the act, F(1, 157) = .005, η2 = .000, p = 
.941. However, when there was no substance use, judgments were dependent upon whether 
(65.5%) or not (60.0%) the offense was planned, F(1, 157) = 7.06, η2 = .043, p = .009. 
Presence of mental disorder 
With regard to judgments about the presence or absence of mental disorder, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA again revealed a signifi cant main effect for offender verbalization of control, with 
participants being more likely to make an affi rmative judgment that the offender had a mental 
disorder when the offender had made a statement that he could not control his conduct (59.2%) 
than when the offender had made a statement that he could control his conduct (54.9%) (see 
Table 2). Offenders with a history of pedophilic conduct were also signifi cantly more likely to 
be judged as having a mental disorder (67.7%) than offenders without a history of pedophilic 
conduct (46.5%). Further, respondents were signifi cantly more likely to make an affi rmative 
judgment that the offender had a mental disorder when the offense was planned (60.2%) than 
when the offense was not planned (54.0%). There no main effect for substance use. 
With regard to the between subjects variables, a main effect was found for participant 
group, F(2, 152) = 3.15, η2 = .040, p = .046, with psychologists being the most likely to 
judge that the offender had a mental disorder (63.9%) followed by legal professionals 
(63.7%) then jury-eligible undergraduates (50.1%), though only the difference between the 
psychologists and jury-eligible undergraduates was signifi cantly different, t(1, 116) = 2.02, 
p = .046. There was no main effect for context, F(1, 152) = .558, p = .456. 
There was a signifi cant two-way interaction between history of pedophilic behavior and 
planning of the offense, F(1, 152) = 11.19, η2 = .069, p = .001. When the offender had a history of 
pedophilic behavior, judgments about mental disorder did not depend upon whether the offense 
was (68.7%) or was not (67.1%) planned, F(1, 157) = .877, η2 = .006, p = .351. However, when 
the offender had no known history of pedophilic behavior, respondents were signifi cantly more 
likely to judge that the offender had a mental disorder when the offense was planned (52.0%) 
than when the offense was not planned (41.0%), F(1, 157) = 25.76, η2 = .141, p = .000. 
There was also a signifi cant interaction between participant sample and context, F(2, 
152) = 3.58, η2 = .045, p = .030. Though a post hoc comparison did not reveal signifi cant 
differences between groups in the SVP condition, psychologists in the insanity context were 
more likely to perceive that the offender had a mental disorder (74.6%) than jury-eligible 
under graduates (46.6%), with legal professionals in between. Post hoc comparisons also 
revealed that judges were signifi cantly more likely to view offenders as having a mental 
disorder in the SVP context (74.7%) than in the insanity context (50.3%), t(1, 40) = 2.48, 
p = .017, though psychol ogists and jury-eligible undergraduates did not show signifi cant 
differences in their judgments about mental disorder across the two hearing contexts. 
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Likelihood of future sexual violence 
Participants were signifi cantly more likely to make an affi rmative judgment that the 
offender would be sexually violent in the future when the offender had a long history of 
pedophilic offenses (92.9%) than when the offender had no known history of pedophilic 
offenses (72.3%) (see Table 2). There was also a signifi cant main effect for planning of 
the offense, with respondents being more likely to make an affi rmative judgment that the 
offender would be sexually violent in the future when the offense was planned (88.3%) 
compared to when the offense was not planned (76.9%). There were no signifi cant main 
effects for offender verbalization of control or substance use during the crime. 
With regard to the between-subjects factors, there was a signifi cant main effect for context, 
F(1, 152) = 5.56, η2 = .035, p = .020, with participants being more likely to judge that the 
of fender would be violent in the future when making the judgment in the context of an SVP 
hearing (86.6%) than when making the judgment in the context of an insanity hearing (77.8%). 
There was no signifi cant main effect for participant group, F(2, 152) = .218, p = .805.2 
There was a signifi cant two-way interaction between the offender’s statement with regard 
to his ability to control conduct and offense planning, F(1, 152) = 5.103, η2 = .032, p = .025. 
Post hoc analyses revealed that when offenders had voiced having control, judgments about 
future sexual violence were dependent on whether (89.1%) or not (75.2%) the offense was 
planned, F(1, 157) = 57.01, η2 = .266, p = .000. When offenders had verbalized a lack of 
control, judgments were also dependent on whether (87.3%) or not (78.6%) the offense 
was planned, F(1, 157) = 30.10, η2 = .161, p = .000. 
There was also a signifi cant two-way interaction between history of pedophilic offenses 
and offense planning, F(1, 152) = 37.02, η2 = .196, p = .001. When there was an offense 
history, participants were more likely to say that an offender would be sexually violent 
when the offense was planned (94.8%) than when the offense was not planned (90.9%), 
F(1, 157) = 9.85, η2 = .059, p = .002. When there was no history, participants were also 
more likely to fi nd future sexual violence when the offense was planned (81.8%) than when 
the offense was not planned (63.0%), F(1,157) = 61.30, η2 = .281, p = .000. 
Confi dence measures 
Analyses that combined the dichotomous judgments with participants’ confi dence ratings 
to create “judgment-strength” measures yielded comparable results. As decisionmakers in 
commit ment and insanity contexts are required only to make dichotomous judgments, these 
judgment-strength analyses are not presented here (but are available from the fi rst author). 
Discussion 
The notion of volitional impairment has long been a confused concept in the courts, with 
psychological and legal experts frequently noting the hollow nature of the concept. Janus 
(2001) commented that the concept “lacks substance” and may amount to no more than 
“unstructured moral guesswork” (pp. 1–2), while Schopp (2001) argues that neither the 
2 
Despite the intention to examine only main effects and two-way interactions as per Stolle et al. (2002), all 
three-way interactions for sample group were also examined given the somewhat surprising lack of differences 
between sample groups (i.e., absence of fi ndings). There were, however, no signifi cant three-way interactions 
involving sample group. Though not presented here, these analyses are available from the fi rst author. 
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courts nor legislatures have “developed a normative account of volitional impairment that 
falls short of the clear cases such as seizure movements.” (p. 246). The Association for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) (2001) in an amicus curiae fi led in Crane notes that 
the volitional impairment standard is “untenable,” “meaningless,” and “unworkable” (p. 2). 
ATSA further suggests that this standard “has been largely rejected by both the medical and 
legal professions.” If these criticisms are accurate, then the notion of volitional impairment 
cannot serve the discriminative function of separating those appropriate for this specialized 
form of commitment from those more appropriately dealt with through the criminal justice 
system (Hendricks, 1997). The primary goal of this study was to identify the factors that 
lead legal, psychological, and lay actors to make judgments of volitional impairment. 
A number of key fi ndings emerge from the results. To start, results revealed that the 
offender’s verbalization of control (or lack thereof) is relevant to a determination of volitional 
impairment. Indeed, participants (both professionals and non-professionals) seemed quite 
willing to accept such assertions as evidence of inability to control. This fi nding does appear 
to comport with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hendricks (1997), given that the Court 
seemed to rely upon Hendricks’ own statement that he loses control when “stressed out” (p. 
2078) to support its determination that he suffered such volitional impairment. While it may 
seem intuitive to view an offender as lacking control when he admits just such an impairment, 
such testimony is, of course, of questionable validity. Indeed, given the planned, organized, 
and goal-directed nature of Hendricks’ (and most pedophilic) assaults, there is little support 
for the assertion of a lack of control (Schopp, 2001, p. 28). Also problematic is that such 
subjective report could readily be exaggerated or minimized given an offender’s desire to 
qualify for or avoid a particular legal status (Morse, 1998). 
Decisionmakers were also more likely to conclude that an offender lacked control when 
there was a history of pedophilic conduct. Again, this fi nding seems to correspond to the 
Hendricks analysis, though it is somewhat perplexing given Schopp’s (1998) observation 
that the mere fact that some individuals choose to repeatedly act upon criminal desires does 
not in itself provide evidence of a lack of control. Indeed, if habit or simple repetition of 
activities were suffi cient to establish a volitional impairment, then a person who regularly 
engages in any criminal or non-criminal activity could be said to be volitionally impaired. 
Moreover, if history of pedophilic behavior provides evidence of a loss of control, then how 
does one differentiate the offender who veritably loses control from one with antisocial 
tendencies who repeatedly acts on sexual urges simply because he chooses to do so? 
While the present data are less robust with regard to the importance of planning in the 
determination of volitional impairment, respondents were more likely to affi rm diffi culty 
controlling behavior when the offense was not planned. Intuitively, this fi nding makes 
sense, to the extent that participants viewed planning as representative of acting with 
forethought or intention. This less robust fi nding may explain the aforementioned mixed 
treatment that evidence of planning has received in the courts. Notably, use of substances 
at the time of the assault was not related to fi ndings of volitional impairment. Because 
substances may impair judgment and related cog nitive processes and hence the ability to 
regulate behavior (Casbon, 2005; Fillmore et al., 2005; Lundqvist, 2005), it is somewhat 
curious why participants did not view intoxication as impacting one’s capacity for control. 
It would be valuable to investigate whether participants would have viewed “harder” drug 
use (e.g., cocaine), heavier alcohol and drug use, or chronic substance use differently. 
Also highly relevant is the context of the hearing. Participants were more likely to view an 
offender as lacking control in the SVP context than in the insanity context. Because we lack 
an articulated description of the types of factors that should be relevant to these alternative 
contexts, it is somewhat diffi cult to evaluate these results. It is conceivable, however, that these 
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alternative contexts should require different levels of volitional impairment, given the different 
functions and potential dispositions of these laws. Having no fi rm basis on which to make 
judgments about this ill-defi ned notion, participants may have framed their decisions with 
reference to preferred disposition. That is, participants may have been more apt to endorse a 
vacuous notion when it supported continued confi nement over release (as in the SVP context) 
or incarceration over hospitalization (as in the insanity context), in line with what Pratt’s (2000) 
suggestion of popular support for tougher measures against sex offenders. 
Determination of mental disorder 
Participants were signifi cantly more likely to affi rm that an offender had a mental disorder 
when there was acknowledgment of a lack of control. Although verbalization of lack of control 
has not been systematically researched and is not found as an explicit criterion in any disorders 
listed within the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a number of disorders are generally associated with 
a failure or “inability” to resist impulses (e.g., Impulse-Control Disorders). Thus, participants 
may have viewed such assertions as indicative of some type of mental impairment. Participants 
were also considerably more likely to view an offender as having a mental disorder when there 
was a history of offenses. Again, insofar as respondents made decisions with regard to modern 
psychiatric nomenclature, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) includes in its defi nition of pedophilia 
recurrent sexual behaviors with a child. It should be noted, however, that individuals who meet 
diagnostic criteria for particular psychological disorder may or may not have the specifi c type 
of impairment that qualifi es them for a particular legal status (such as insanity). 
Unexpectedly, decisionmakers viewed planning as relevant to a determination of mental 
disorder. When there was evidence of planning, participants were signifi cantly more likely 
to view offenders as having a mental disorder. As psychiatric disorders common to those 
who assault children (e.g., Pedophilia) typically include organized, goal-directed behavior 
(albeit toward an objectionable end) this fi nding is explicable. Substance use at the time of 
the assault, however, was not considered relevant to a fi nding of mental disorder. Perhaps 
participants did not consider the use indicated to be suggestive of a larger pattern of 
dependence of the type that might qualify as a “mental disorder”. 
While overall there were few between group differences, the samples did show some 
impor tant differences in their judgments about mental disorder. Specifi cally, psychologists 
and legal professionals showed highly comparable rates of affi rming mental disorder that 
were consider ably higher than that of the jury-eligible undergraduates, perhaps refl ecting 
professional bias or expert knowledge. 
Likelihood of future sexual violence 
With regard to judgments about whether an offender is likely to be sexually violent in the 
future, participants considered a history of violence to be highly relevant to their decisions. 
Indeed, participants were far more likely to affi rm that the offender would be sexually 
violent if the offender had a history of sexual violence. Notably, an overwhelming majority 
(92.9%) judged that the offender would be sexually violent in the future when there was a 
history of sex crimes, and a large majority (72.3%) also judged that the offender would be 
sexually violent in the future even without a history of sex crimes. Given that measures of 
deviant sexual interest are among the single factors most predictive of sexual recidivism 
(any deviant sexual interest [d = .31], sexual interest in children [d = .33], and paraphilic 
interests [d = .21]) (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004), the importance of a history of 
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sexual deviancy may at fi rst glance seem to comport with what the research dictates. 
However, as mentioned, Hanson (2003) warned that no one factor is robust enough alone to 
be predictive of sexual violence. Moreover, Hanson and Morton-Bourgon’s (2004) meta-
analytic review observed a sexual offense recidivism rate of 13.7% after approximately fi ve 
years. While such research likely underrepresents true rates of recidivism, Hanson (2003) 
notes that empirical studies rarely fi nd sex offense recidivism rates higher than 40%. Thus, 
participants in this sample may have overestimated the likelihood of recidivism. These 
overestimations are, however, consistent with those of Guy and Edens (2003). 
Given that participants in this study found offense planning to be relevant to fi ndings of 
future sexual violence, systematic investigation to ascertain its utility as a risk marker for 
sexual violence might be valuable. While offender verbalization was relevant to decisions 
of mental disorder and volitional control, there was no main effect of offender verbalization 
on determinations of future sexual violence. As noted, prior research has found that 
statements indicating intention to commit a future sex crime are associated with decisions 
about reoffense risk and recommendations for civil commitment (Levenson, 2003). Use 
of substances at the time of the assault was unrelated to judgments about future sexual 
violence. Notably, substance use is, at best, a modest predictor (d = .12) of sexual recidivism 
(Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004). Moreover, decisionmakers were more likely to judge 
that the offender would be violent when they were informed that their decision was in the 
context of a sexual predator (as opposed to an insanity) hearing, suggesting a reliance on 
context rather than empirically supported risk factors. 
Conclusions 
Although research suggests that variations in experimental verisimilitude have little effect 
on mock jurors’ decision (Bornstein, 1999), a limitation of this study could have been the 
vignette methodology. Future research might present evidence in a manner that is more 
realistic than the brief vignette utilized in this study to examine whether such presentation 
affects decision-making. Indeed, replication of this study might include, for example, 
presentation of expert testimony from both the prosecution and defense, video presentation 
of defendant testimony, and/or more thorough presentation of evidence in a trial-like 
format. That said, the present study is the fi rst empirical examination of decision making 
about the notion of volitional impairment. Because there exists a myriad of variables which 
may impact judgments about volitional impairment, it would be valuable to examine in 
future studies how other variables (e.g., behavioral impulsivity or measures of cognitive 
functioning) relate to judgments about volitional impairment. 
This study begins to shed light on the types of factors that legal professionals, 
psychologists, and jurors “count” as evidence of volitional impairment. Although it 
remains ambiguous what the criteria underlying the notion should be, this study provides 
information on the types of factors that relevant legal actors are including in their 
judgments (e.g., history of sexual violence, verbalization of control, context of hearing, 
and sometimes planning) and the types of factors that they are discounting (e.g., substance 
use). One of the more interesting fi ndings is perhaps the general absence of differences 
among groups, suggesting that professionals and undergraduates are consistent in their 
consideration of factors relevant volitional impairment. This may support Morse’s (2004) 
contention that “expert” opinion about volition is not based on any empirically grounded 
conceptualization of the notion but rather refl ects commonsense, subjective moral opinions 
(that professionals and non-professionals share). Indeed, if the decisions are, in fact, based 
on indefensible conclusions, one must consider the ethical concern that clinicians may 
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in fact be overstepping the bounds of their competence by providing pseudo-expertise 
about volition. Finally, this study provides the courts with information about what legal 
actors and mental health experts are doing in practice when it comes to making decisions 
about volitional impairment. This research gives the courts and legislatures an opportunity 
to decide whether these identifi ed variables are those that should comprise volitional 
impairment, and moreover, whether they help to serve the necessary discriminative 
function. If they are not the types of variables that should “matter,” then this suggests 
that the courts and legislatures need to be more explicit in articulating what the notion of 
volitional impairment is. They might identify, for example, how these identifi ed factors and 
others support or fail to support a fi nding of volitional impairment. 
Notably, participants in this study seemed to make decisions in a manner consistent with 
Hendricks. As noted above, participants were similar to the Hendricks Court in that they 
seemed to rely upon the offender’s own assertions and history of pedophilic conduct to 
support deter minations of volitional impairment. Despite the seeming congruence between 
the Court and participants in this sample, however, the issue remains as to why verbalization 
of lack of control and history should be indicative of volitional impairment. Even applying 
the less absolute “seri ous diffi culty” standard suggested in Crane, there is still an apparent 
contradiction in saying that such seemingly goal-directed and organized behavior was in 
some manner volitionally impaired. 
Given the controversial nature of this specialized form of civil commitment, it is 
important that commitment be predicated upon a meaningful and justifi able articulation 
of volitional impairment, i.e., a justifi catory explanation of the concept which provides 
explanation for why those with control problems are suitable subjects for commitment. 
With knowledge about the meaning of this notion, we can begin to assess whether it serves 
to distinguish in a non-arbitrary manner those appropriate for only criminal justice sanction 
from those also eligible for civil commitment as a sexual predator. 
Appendix 
Vignette sample 1: All factors present 
William [is currently incarcerated for having/is alleged to have] sexually assaulted a young 
child. At the time of the [alleged] sexual assault, William had been drinking heavily and using 
marijuana. Evidence revealed at trial indicated that William had carefully planned the [alleged] 
assault, by “grooming” the child with candy and other indulgences and planning a time when 
the child’s mother would not be around. William admits that he is unable to control his conduct 
when he gets stressed out. Notably, William has a long history of pedophilic behavior. 
Vignette sample 2: All factors absent 
Adam [is currently incarcerated for having/is alleged to have] sexually assaulted a young 
child. There was no evidence to show that Adam had been drinking or using drugs at the 
time of the [alleged] sexual assault. Evidence revealed at trial indicated that Adam had 
not carefully planned the [alleged] assault, having not coaxed the child in any manner 
nor planned a time when others would not be around. Adam acknowledges that he is able 
to control his conduct, even when under extreme stress. Notably, Adam has no known 
history of pedophilic behavior. Psychiatric evidence also reveals that Adam shows no gross 
impairment in reality testing and his intelligence is within normal limits. 
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